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NOTES
EVICTION WITHOUT CONVICTION: PUBLIC
HOUSING LEASEHOLD FORFEITURE UNDER 21 U.S.C.

SECTION 881
On April 27, 1990, a group of law enforcement officials that included
over thirty United States marshals, local police officers, and a SWAT Team
wearing ski masks and carrying automatic weapons, forcibly entered four
apartments in an Ann Arbor, Michigan, public housing complex., Law
enforcement officials gave the six adults and seven children in the targeted
units ten to fifteen minutes to gather personal belongings before evicting
them. 2 As the police boarded up the windows and changed the locks on the
doors of the apartments, local news stations filmed the scene and a United
States Attorney proclaimed the evictions another victory in the war on
3
drugs.

The Ann Arbor evictions were part of a United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Department of Justice pilot

program instituted nationwide on June 25, 1990. 4 On that date, HUD

1. Oppat, FederalAgents Evict 6 from Housing, Ann Arbor News, Apr. 28, 1990, at
Al, col. 1. See also Gearhart, UNITY Fights Back Against Property Seizures, TENANTS' VOICE,
May-June 1990, at 1, col. 1 (describing evictions of tenants at Ann Arbor public housing
complex). One tenant described the eviction from her public housing unit:
[A] group of five men came into my house and seized it. I was just starting to
feed the baby breakfast when the men entered my house and told me that I had ten
minutes to gather my belongings and get out. Two of the men were uniformed
policemen. Two of the men wore hoods. One man had a U.S. marshal's jacket. The
men were armed. One of the hooded men carried a camera and began filming my
house. My daughter Renita woke up with three strange men, including a man with
a hood, in her room. They were filming her in bed when she awoke. The men
refused to leave the room when my daughter got up. She was forced to get up and
dress with them present. Renita was extremely upset by these actions.... I was
given ten or fifteen minutes to gather a few clothes in a bag and then led out of
my home.... After I was evicted, I spent a couple of nights at the Embassy Hotel
with a Department of Social Services Emergency Housing Voucher. The Hotel told
me they wouldn't allow my children to stay with us. I was forced to split up my
family and leave my children with a friend.
Affidavit of Victoria Nelson, reprinted in ABA RECOMMENDATION, ABA Special Comm. on
Housing and Urban Development Law, at 3 (1990) (proposing that courts grant victims of
Public Housing Asset Forfeiture Project (Forfeiture Project) notice and opportunity to be
heard prior to seizure). See also infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (describing tenant's
account of leasehold forfeiture as comparable to full-fledged criminal search).
2. Affidavit of Victoria Nelson, supra note 1.
3. Gearhart, supra note 1.
4. U.S. Seizing Leases of People Suspected in Illegal Drug Deals, N.Y. Times, June
26, 1990, at A16, col. I [hereinafter U.S. Seizing Leases]; see Richmond Tenants Org., Inc.
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launched the Public Housing Asset Forfeiture Demonstration Project (Forfeiture Project) in nineteen cities across the United States.' The Forfeiture
Project did not involve traditional evictions, but instead used what HUD
characterized as "leasehold forfeitures" to accomplish its purposes. 6 The
use of leasehold forfeitures purportedly enabled law enforcement officials
to remove, more quickly than allowed under standard eviction procedures,
public housing tenants suspected of drug trafficking. 7 In a leasehold forfei-

v. Kemp, 753 F. Supp. 607, 608 (E.D. Va. 1990) (describing Forfeiture Project); Kemp Plan:
Evict Drug Dealers from Public Housing, Chicago Tribune, May 16, 1990, at C14, col. 1

(same).
5. U.S. Seizing Leases, supra note 4. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) originally had planned to implement its Forfeiture Project in 22 cities. Id.
HUD officials refused to explain their reasons for eliminating three unidentified cities from
the final target list. Id.
6. Squitieri, Public Housing Drug Suspects Get the Boot, USA Today, June 25, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt. File. The term "leasehold forfeiture" refers to the
government's eviction of the tenants from the premises and commencement of formal civil
forfeiture proceedings against the property. Id.; see infra notes 37-50 and accompanying text
(describing civil forfeiture procedure).
7. U.S. Seizing Leases, supra note 4. HUD and the Department of Justice developed
criteria for selecting those public housing tenants most suitable for eviction under the Forfeiture
Project:
1. The violator should be the leaseholder of the property. (The term "violator
refers to the person whose actions give rise to the forfeiture.)
2. Compelling evidence should be developed that the violator participated in at
least two felony drug offenses. (Drug purchases by undercover law enforcement
officials from individual notorious drug dealers or evidence obtained pursuant to a
search warrant would satisfy this criteria.)
3. Where appropriate, the violator should be prosecuted by local, state, or federal
authorities for drug activities.
4. The property should be an open and notorious site of drug distribution.
5. Careful consideration should be given to factors involving family members of
the violator and other registered occupants of the property. Those involved in this
effort will seek to minimize the impact of the government's actions on minors and/
or elderly, should they be effected by the action. Appropriate human resource
services support (i.e. child welfare, emergency shelter, etc.) should be prearranged
where minors or the elderly are effected.
HUD and Justice Announce Strike Against Drug Dealers in Public Housing, PR Newswire,
June 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
Ironically, litigation stemming from HUD's implementation of the Forfeiture Project has
resulted in many leasehold forfeitures taking longer than if HUD had simply followed normal
eviction procedures. See Anti-Drug Housing Rule is Challenged, Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1990,
at F8, col. 1 (noting that legal and procedural delays have frustrated efforts to evict public
housing tenants accused of drug dealing); Saul, Seeking to BalanceLaw With Order, Newsday,
October 14, 1990, at 4, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curmt. File (same). Consequently,
HUD Secretary Jack Kemp asked the Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation
(LSC) to discourage local affiliates from representing public housing tenants involved in
leasehold forfeiture proceedings. Bryson & Youmans, Crime, Drugs, and Subsidized Housing,
24 CLEAMWOHOUSE REv. 435, 440 (1990). The Board of Directors of the LSC adopted the
following non-binding resolution on June 25, 1990:
Whereas, the drug problem in our country has had a devastating effect on the poor,
especially those who live in public housing; and,
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ture proceeding, a magistrate, on the basis of an informant's testimony at
an ex parte hearing, can grant law enforcement officials an order allowing
the officials to seize a public housing unit without first giving the unit's
tenants the benefit of a pre-seizure notice or hearing.8 By expanding the

Whereas, the Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation is concerned
about reports of the LSC grantees representing persons involved in drug-related
eviction and other housing proceedings involving publicly funded housing; and,
Whereas, resources available to legal services programs to provide legal representation
to the poor are limited, and should be used in the most effective manner and only
for meritorious cases; and,
Whereas, some legal services grantees have opposed recent actions by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development aimed at evicting drug dealers despite government standards that housing authorities have proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
the leaseholder committed at least 2 felony drug crimes and will face prosecution
and despite the fact that the presence of drug dealers in public housing brings misery
to many thousands of poor tenants.
Be it thereforeresolved, that the Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation
urges all legal services grantees to adopt immediately policies that discourage representation of persons involved in drug-related activity in drug-related eviction and
other housing proceedings involving publicly funded housing;
Be it further resolved, that the Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation
urges all legal services grantees to assist eligible tenant organizations, resident
management organizations, and individual clients in anti-drug activities; and,
Be it further resolved, that the Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation
urges Congress to seek a legislative remedy which would prohibit LSC grantees from
representing persons involved in drug-related activity in drug-related eviction and
other housing proceedings involving publicly funded housing.
Memorandum from LSC Board Chairman to Program Boards and Directors (June 29, 1990),
reprintedin 24 CLEARWGHOUSE Rnv. 513 (1990).
Prior to the Forfeiture Project, HUD Secretary Kemp began streamlining evictions of
public housing tenants engaged in drug-trafficking by eliminating the administrative grievance
hearing traditionally required between the tenant and the Public Housing Agency (PHA) before
eviction could occur. National Housing Law Project, Inc., The Exclusion of Evictions from
the Public Housing Grievance Process, 19 HousInG LAw BuLur 43, 43 (1989). Congress
authorized PHAs to exclude evictions from the grievance process if HUD determined that
state court eviction procedures provided the basic elements of due process. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k),
as amended by Act of Nov. 28, 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(k) (1991). By 1990, HUD had
eliminated the administrative grievance hearing in forty states after determining that the court
eviction procedures of those states provided adequate due process to public housing tenants.
Bryson & Youmans, supra at 440-41. See generally Drugs in Federally Assisted Housing:
Hearing on S. 566 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Drugs in
Federally Assisted Housing] (statement of Wade Henderson & Jacqueline Berrien, American
Civil Liberties Union) (criticizing HUD's efforts to eliminate administrative grievance hearing
for drug-related evictions); Note, Drug-RelatedEvictions in Public Housing: Congress' Addiction to a Quick Fix, 9 YALE L. & PoL'y REv. 161 (1991) (authored by Lisa Weil) [hereinafter
Note, Drug-Related Evictions] (criticizing recent congressional and administrative action addressing drug and crime problems in public housing).
8. See ABA REcOMM NDATION, supra note 1, at I (describing operation of Forfeiture
Project); infra notes 37-50 and accompanying text (describing civil forfeiture procedure). But
see infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (examining Richmond Tenants decision requiring
government to provide pre-seizure notice to public housing tenants).
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scope of property interests subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. section
881, 9 the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198810 granted the federal government
the authority to seize public housing leasehold interests used or intended to
be used to facilitate felony drug transactions."

9. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 511 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988)). Subsection 881(a) lists the various kinds of property
subject to seizure by the federal government. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988). Subsection 881(a)(1)
mandates the forfeiture of controlled substances; subsection 881(a)(2) mandates the forfeiture
of materials and equipment used or intended for use in manufacturing or distributing controlled
substances; subsection 881(a)(3) mandates the forfeiture of property used or intended for use
as a container for controlled substances or equipment used to manufacture controlled substances; subsection 881(a)(4) mandates the forfeiture of all conveyances used or intended for
use to deliver or facilitate the delivery of controlled substances; subsection 881(a)(5) mandates
the forfeiture of all books, records, and research used or intended for use in violation of Title
21; subsection 881(a)(6) mandates the forfeiture of all money, negotiable instruments, securities,
or other things of value used or intended to be used in exchange for controlled substances;
subsection 881(a)(7) mandates the forfeiture of all real property, including any leasehold
interest, used in any manner to facilitate the commission of a felony drug offense; subsection
881(a)(8) mandates the forfeiture of all controlled substances possessed in violation of Title
21; subsection 881(a)(9) mandates the forfeiture of all chemicals, drug manufacturing equipment, tableting machines, and gelatin capsules possessed, distributed, or intended to be
distributed in violation of Title 21. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(l)-(9) (1988). Congress amended
§ 881(a) in 1990, adding two subsections to the list of property subject to forfeiture: Subsection
881(a)(10) mandates the forfeiture of all drug paraphernalia; and subsection 881(a)(11) mandates
the forfeiture of all firearms used or intended for use to facilitate the sale, possession, or
concealment of controlled substances, equipment, or proceeds traceable to such property. 21
U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988), as amended by Act of Nov. 29, 1990, 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a) (1991).
Subsections 881(b)-(k) set out the applicable procedures for administering the statute. 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(b)-(k) (1988).
10. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5105, 102 Stat. 4325 (codified
at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)); see infra note 11 (examining significance of Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988).
11. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). For purposes of this Note, two congressional amendments to § 881 are of particular concern. In 1984, Congress amended § 881(a) of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 by passing the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306(a), 98 Stat. 2050 (1984) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
added paragraph (a)(7) to § 881, mandating the forfeiture of real property used to facilitate
drug transactions. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). With the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5105, 102 Stat. 4301 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
(1988)), Congress further amended § 881(a)(7) to include leasehold interests within the scope
of real property subject to forfeiture. Id. Specifically, § 881(a)(7) states:
§ 881 Forfeitures
(a) Subject property. The following property shall be subject to forfeiture to the
United States and no property right shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or
improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this title punishable by
more than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under
this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
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Shortly before HUD began its seizure of leases under the Forfeiture
Project, a group of public housing tenants, in Richmond Tenants Organization, Inc. v. Kemp, 12 sued HUD Secretary Jack Kemp to enjoin HUD
from carrying out the Forfeiture Project.13 On June 18, 1990, Judge Richard
L. Williams of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia issued a preliminary order enjoining HUD from seizing public
housing units located within the Eastern District of Virginia unless the
government first provided tenants with pre-seizure notice and an opportunity
for a hearing. 14 Judge Williams issued a final ruling in the case on December
19, 1990, holding that all public housing leaseholders had to be informed,
through a letter, that forfeiture of their leaseholds without prior notice and
of the seizure,
hearing is illegal. 5 Although HUD now gives tenants notice
6
it has continued to implement the Forfeiture Project.
This Note argues that the use of 21 U.S.C. section 881, the civil
forfeiture statute, as a means for implementing the Forfeiture Project, is
fraught with constitutional problems. Part I of this Note examines the
history of in rem forfeiture and examines how the modern civil forfeiture
statute, section 881, evolved. Part II argues that the forfeiture of a public

omission established by that owner to have been committed without the knowledge
or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988) (emphasis added).
12. 753 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Va. 1990).
13. Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 753 F. Supp. 607, 608 (E.D. Va. 1990).
14. Id. A few days after issuing the order calling for pre-seizure notice in public housing
leasehold evictions, Judge Williams granted the tenants' motion for a national class and
expanded the initial order to include all public housing tenants in the United States. Id. Cf.
United States v. Premises & Real Property Located at 4492 S. Livonia Road, 889 F.2d 1258,
1262-65 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that ex parte seizure of private home under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7) without notice and hearing for homeowner violates due process), reh'g denied, 897
F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1990).
15. Richmond Tenants, 753 F. Supp. at 610. Judge Williams based his decision in
Richmond Tenants on the fact that pre-seizure notice and hearing substantially reduce the risk
that an erroneous deprivation of property will occur. Id. Judge Williams said that an adversarial
hearing at which the accused can confront and cross-examine his accusers permits the accused
to ferret out mistaken or intentionally false testimony. Id. Judge Williams added that because
a home is immobile, unlike a car, plane, or yacht, the possibility of exigent circumstances
requiring only an exparte probable cause hearing is limited. Id. at 609. Finally, Judge Williams
noted that the government still may establish its strong interest in deterring drug trafficking
regardless of whether the seizure occurs before or after an adversarial proceeding. Id. at 610.
See United States v. Premises & Real Property Located at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d
1258, 1262-65 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that before forfeiture of home can occur, government
must provide notice and opportunity to be heard, absent exigent circumstances), reh'g denied,
897 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1990); In re Kingsley, 802 F.2d 571, 580 (Ist Cir. 1986) (Coffin, J.,
concurring) (same); United States v. Leasehold Interest in Property Located at 850 S. Maple,
743 F. Supp. 505, 509-10 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (same); United States v. Parcel I, Beginning at a
Stake, 731 F. Supp. 1348, 1352 (S.D. I11. 1990) (permitting no-notice seizure in forfeiture
action only when necessary to prevent further unlawful activity or destruction or concealment
of property).
16. LaFraniere, U.S. Alters Plan to Evict Drug Dealers, Wash. Post, June 26, 1990, at
AS, col. 1.
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housing leasehold interest is really a criminal in personam forfeiture, not a
civil in rem forfeiture. By using traditional tests developed by the United
States Supreme Court, Part II demonstrates that the leasehold forfeitures
contemplated by HUD and the Department of Justice are criminal in nature.
As a result, the Constitution demands that courts provide the civil forfeiture
claimant with the full protection of criminal procedural rights. Part III

discusses Eighth Amendment issues raised by public housing leasehold
forfeiture. Finally, Part IV examines the definition of leasehold interests in
section 881 and identifies the inherent conceptual problems that the government encounters when it attempts to seize intangible, non-transferable
property interests.

I. EVOLUTION OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
The idea that inanimate objects involved in wrongful acts should be
subject to forfeiture has existed since biblical times. 7 Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. analyzed the development of the forfeiture concept and other related
early forms of liability in The Common Law.' The development of the
principle of in rem, or civil, forfeiture resulted from early man's need to
pacify his desire for revenge by personifying the offending object. 9 This
led persons to attach liability to the object doing the damage rather than
to the object's owner. 20 Holmes believed that primitive man blamed objects
rather than their owners because primitive man was incapable of identifying
the actor ultimately responsible in the chain of causation. 2' From these
beginnings, the medieval English institution of the deodand developed.22
Under the institution of the deodand, any object causing the death of a
person was subject to forfeiture to the Crown. 23 Holmes viewed the institution of the deodand as an advancement over the earlier state of affairs,
because a person's death was no longer solely the concern of the deceased's
friends and relatives, but instead was also the concern of the Crown. 24 The

17. See Exodus 21:28 (concerning biblical concept of forfeiture). "If an ox gore a man
or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten;
but the owner of the ox shall be quit [absolved]." Id.
18. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-38 (1923 ed.).

19. Id. at 11. "The hatred for anything giving us pain ... leads even civilized man to
kick a door which pinches his finger." Id. Holmes cites the example of a tree which falls on
a man and kills him. Id. The tree is comparable to an animal in its nature, and is chopped
into pieces for the deceased's relatives, thereby quelling what Holmes terms the "passion of
revenge." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-84 (examining
historical roots of civil forfeiture); D.B. SMrmH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FoREarrUR

CASES § 2.02 (1985 & Supp. 1990) (examining history of in rem forfeiture). The use of the
term "deodand" to describe the medieval institution of subjecting to forfeiture any object
causing the death of a person is derived from the Latin Deo dandum, which means "to be
given to God." Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n.16.
23. SmrH, supra note 22, § 2.02.
24. HOLMES, supra note 18, at 24.
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Crown now took over the family's claim to the offending object and used
the value of the object toward purchasing masses for the soul of the
deceased, or for some other charitable purpose. 25 However, the deodand
soon became a source of revenue for whomever the Crown designated as
the public beneficiary. 26 The use of the deodand was not abolished in
England until the middle of the nineteenth century with the passage of the
first wrongful death statute. 27
The institution of the deodand and Holmes' personification theory
explain many of the differences between the modem civil and criminal
forfeiture statutes. Because the concept of civil forfeiture evolved from the
legal fiction that property associated with a criminal act is itself guilty of
the wrongdoing, a criminal conviction of the property owner is not a
prerequisite to a successful civil forfeiture suit.2 In contrast, in personam,
or criminal, forfeitures center upon a defendant's personal guilt. 29 At early

25. Id. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 (1974) (examining history of civil forfeiture).
26. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures,
Wrongful Death and the Western Notation of Sovereignty, 46 TEIm. L.Q. 169, 182 (1973).
27. See SmrrH, supra note 22, § 2.02 (tracing history of in rem forfeiture). Examining
the history and evolution of forfeiture, the Supreme Court noted in Calero-Toledo that the
abolition of the deodand institution in nineteenth century England was simultaneous with the
passage of Lord Campbell's Act creating a cause of action for wrongful death. Calero-Toledo,
416 U.S. at 681 n.19. The two occurrences were linked because Lord Campbell did not want
to abolish the deodand institution, with its tendency to deter carelessness, particularly by
railroads, unless the law granted the deceased's survivors a right of action. Id.
In the seventeenth century, England's Navigation Acts used a specific application of an
in rem forfeiture-a procedure known as the maritime lien. See Homs, supra note 18, at
25-29 (noting that rationale and historical justification for institution of deodand applied with
same force and logic in admiralty law); Smrr, supra note 22, § 2.03 (examining history of
civil forfeiture and English admiralty law). A ship, if involved in an accident or if its owner
attempted to avoid paying customs duties, was typically the only source of security in dealing
with distant trading partners. Hou.ms, supra note 18, at 28. The easiest way to satisfy a claim
in these instances was to seize the ship, leaving the foreign owners to seek indemnity elsewhere.
Id. Merchants liked the system of in rem forfeiture because they could proceed against the
property itself with a greater chance of compensation than in a suit at common law against
some destitute master or part owner of a ship. Steckley, Merchants and the Admiralty Courts
During the English Revolution, 22 Am. J. LEA HIsT. 137, 143, 151 (1978). See Note, Fear
and Loathing and the ForfeitureLaws, 75 CourNE L. R.v. 1151, 1153 (1990) (authored by
Michael Schecter) [hereinafter Note, Fear and Loathing] (noting that merchant class preferred
in rem forfeiture proceeding). Consequently, American forfeiture statutes borrowed some
provisions from English admiralty and customs laws governing in rem forfeiture. SMrrH, supra
note 22, § 2.03. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682-83 (examining development of in rem
forfeiture statutes in America); 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988) (providing for "[s]eizure pursuant
to Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims").
28. See United States v. One 1976 Chevrolet Corvette, 477 F. Supp. 32, 34 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (finding that innocence, non-involvement, and lack of negligence of owner of seized
property are not valid defenses to forfeiture action); Smrw, supra note 22, § 2.03 (same).
Because civil forfeiture is based upon the legal fiction that the property is the wrongdoer,
peculiar case names result, with the government as the plaintiff and the property as the named
defendant. Chevrolet Corvette, 477 F. Supp. at 32. The owner of the property is referred to
as the claimant. Id. at 33.
29. See 21 U.S.C. §-853(a) (1988) (requiring property owner's conviction of underlying
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common law, the convicted felon forfeited all his personal and real property
to the Crown, based on the rationale that in committing the criminal offense
the convicted felon had breached the king's peace and no longer deserved
the right to own property. 0 The same rationale underlies the modem criminal
forfeiture statute. The defendant's personal guilt gives the government the
right to seize property connected with the defendant owner's criminal
activities.3" Therefore, a successful criminal forfeiture proceeding can take
32
place only after the criminal conviction of the property owner.
In response to the escalating drug problem in the United States, Congress
developed the modern civil forfeiture statute by amending the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and enhancing section 881, with the intention
of giving law enforcement officials a more effective way to take the profit
out of the drug trade. 3 The use of the enhanced provisions of section 881
is controversial, not only because it often results in what some consider
excessive penalties,3 but also because Congress has classified section 881 as
a civil statute.35 By using the civil label, Congress rendered inapplicable
many constitutional safeguards that would otherwise have been available if
36
Congress had labeled section 881 a criminal statute.
The government usually initiates a civil forfeiture action under section
881 by means of a magistrate's issuance of a seizure warrant at an ex parte

felony drug transaction before government may bring criminal forfeiture action); Smrrm, supra
note 22, § 2.03 (examining differences between civil and criminal forfeiture).
30. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682 (1974) (noting historical rationale of criminal
forfeiture).
31. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988) (requiring property owner's conviction of underlying
offense before property becomes subject to forfeiture).
32. Id.
33. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADbMuN. NEWS, 3182, 3374-3404 (providing legislative history of passage of Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984). The 1984 amendments to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 enhanced the use of civil and criminal forfeitures because
Congress expanded the scope of property subject to forfeiture. Id. at 3377. See also supra
note 11 (examining amendments to 21 U.S.C. § 881).
34. See infra note 157 (noting commentators expressing Eighth Amendment concerns
with § 881 civil forfeiture statute).
35. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988) (placing civil forfeiture statute in part of Title 21
labeled "Administrative and Enforcement Provisions") with 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988) (placing
criminal forfeiture statute in part of Title 21 labeled "Criminal Offenses and Penalties"); see
also United States v. Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars, 689 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding
that Congress intended civil label in § 881 forfeiture statute), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099
(1984); Note, Fear and Loathing, supra note 27, at 1155 (same).
36. See infra notes 51-120 and accompanying text (examining courts' inconsistent approach to applying full range of criminal procedure to civil forfeiture cases). See, e.g., United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-66 (1984) (holding that Fifth
Amendment's double jeopardy clause does not apply to civil forfeiture proceeding); United
States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718-21 (1971) (holding that Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to civil forfeiture proceeding); One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965) (holding that exclusionary rule
applies to civil forfeiture proceeding).
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probable cause hearing. 37 Once the magistrate grants the warrant, the
government may seize the property.38 At trial, the most important principle
governing section 881 civil forfeiture is that, after the government makes
39
an initial probable cause showing, the burden of proof shifts to the claimant.
Although the government must make an initial probable cause showing, it
may do so through the use of hearsay. 40 The government presents its
probable cause showing as its case-in-chief before the jury, establishing that
it has reasonable grounds, rising above mere suspicion, to believe that the
property is subject to forfeiture. 4' The claimant has the right to crossexamine witnesses that the government may put on to make its probable
cause showing. 42 Following this cross-examination, the claimant presents his
case-in-chief. 43 The claimant, however, must limit his presentation to ad-

37. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988) (listing procedures by which government may initiate
civil forfeiture action). The Second Circuit explained the various means by which the government may seize property under § 881(b): The government may file a complaint consistent with
the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims that permit a court clerk
to issue a summons and warrant for the arrest of the vessel or other property without requiring
a certification of exigent circumstances. United States v. Premises & Real Property Located
at 4492 S. Livonia Road, 889 F.2d 1258, 1262 (2d Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 897 F.2d 659 (2d
Trr AND MAnrrMm CLAImS C(3)
Cir. 1990); see SuPPEMsrENTL RuLEs FOR CERTAN ADna
(listing procedures for forfeiture of property). If the Attorney General has probable cause to
believe that the property is subject to civil forfeiture, the government may seize the property
following applicable customs laws, and in accordance with § 881(d). Livonia Road, 889 F.2d
at 1262. Finally, the government may request a seizure warrant in the manner provided for in
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring an ex parte probable cause determination
by a magistrate. Id. at 1262-63; see FED. R. Cium. P. 41 (providing mechanism for obtaining
warrant).
38. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988).
39. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988) (stating applicable laws governing burden of proof in
civil forfeiture proceeding). Placing the burden of proof on the claimant is a procedure
borrowed from the customs and navigation laws governing the English system of in rem
forfeiture. See supra note 27, (tracing development of in rem forfeiture in America). Section
881(d) incorporates, by reference, 19 U.S.C. § 1615, the statute governing the burden of proof
in civil forfeiture suits. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988). Section 1615 provides in pertinent part:
In all suits or actions ...brought for the forfeiture of any vessel, vehicle, aircraft,
merchandise, or baggage seized under the provisions of any 11.w relating to the
collection of duties on imports or tonnage, where the property is claimed by any
person, the burden of proof shall lie upon such claimant; and in all suits or actions
brought for the recovery of the value of any vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise,
or baggage, because of violation of any such law, the burden of proof shall be upon
the defendant: Provided,That probable cause shall be first shown for the institution
of such suit or action, to be judged of by the court[.]
19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988) (emphasis in original). For an examination of the burden of proof
problem in civil forfeiture proceedings see Sisrr, supra note 22, § 11.03.
40. Livonia Road, 889 F.2d at 1267. See SmrrH, supra note 22, § 11.03 (noting that
government can demonstrate probable cause with hearsay evidence); Landman & Hieronymus,
Civil Forfeiture of Real Property under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 70 MIcH. B.J. 174, 177-78
(1991) (same).
41. United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1160 (2d Cir. 1986).
42. SmrrH, supra note 22, § 11.03.
43. Id.
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missible evidence. 44 The claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, either that no nexus existed between the property and the drug

trafficking, 45 or that the illegal use was without the claimant's knowledge
or consent.4 If the claimant produces no such evidence, the court may
grant the government summary judgment based solely upon its earlier
probable cause showing.4 7 After the claimant has made his case-in-chief,
the government is given the opportunity for rebuttal.4 s The fact that a. court

previously has acquitted a claimant in a criminal action does not frustrate
a later civil forfeiture action against the claimant's property because of the
lower standard of proof required in the civil setting. 49 However, a criminal
conviction collaterally estops an owner from asserting in a later civil
forfeiture proceeding that his property was not connected with drug deal50
ing.
II.

DuE PRocEss IssuEs

The constitutional safeguards controlling criminal prosecutions are not
applicable to civil enforcement proceedings. 5' Accordingly, in a civil pro44. United States v. Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618, 622-23 (3rd
Cir. 1989).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). Section 881(a)(7) subjects to forfeiture real property
"which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate"
the commission of a felony drug transaction. Id. See generally Note, Substantial Connection
and the Illusive FacilitationElement for Civil Forfeitureof Narcoband in Drug Felony Cases,
25 U. oF RIcHMoND L. REv. 171 (1990) (authored by Steven S. Biss) (examining wide range
of judicial interpretation of term "facilitate" in § 881(a)).
46. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). Section 881(a)(7) allows a claimant to avoid forfeiture
by establishing an innocent owner defense. Id. In order to establish an innocent owner defense,
the claimant must prove that he had no knowledge of illegal drug activity or, if he had
knowledge, that he did not consent to the illegal dug activity. Id.; but see generally Note, The
Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfeitureunder the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, 58 FORDHIA L. REV. 471 (1989) (authored by Lalit K. Loomba) (discussing
courts' various interpretations of "knowledge or consent" language of § 881(a)). The statutory
innocent owner defense developed from language found in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974):
[I]t would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose
property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or
consent. Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who proved not only that
he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had
done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property[.]
Id. at 689 (citations omitted). For an example of a claimant's successful use of the innocent
owner defense, see United States v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp.
1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
47. Smrgr, supra note 22, § 11.03.
48. Id.
49. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972) (holding

that defendant's acquittal on criminal charges does not foreclose civil forfeiture proceeding
because of differing burdens of proof); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938) (same).
50. See United States v. One 1975 Chevrolet K-5 Blazer, 495 F. Supp. 737, 740 (W.D.
Mich. 1980) (holding that government may rely on facts adjudicated in prior criminal proceeding
to establish probable cause requirement of civil forfeiture).
51. See Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 402.04 (holding that civil procedure is incompatible with
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ceeding, the court may direct a verdict against the defendant, the government
is not required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
government can appeal an adverse finding.5 2 In addition, the civil defendant
does not have the protection of the criminal trial guaranties of the Sixth
Amendment 3 or the self-incrimination clause and the double jeopardy
clause 4 of the Fifth Amendment. 55,Although the congressional labeling of
a statute as either criminal or civil is compelling evidence of congressional
intent as to the procedures that should apply, the label alone is not
controlling.5 6 The determinative inquiry is whether the statute at issue,
although labeled civil, is5 7 actually criminal in nature, serving punitive rather
than remedial purposes.
Because of the frequently harsh results of civil forfeiture statutes, the
Supreme Court has, on several occasions, characterized civil forfeiture
proceedings as quasi-criminal in nature and, thus, deserving of some of the
traditionally criminal constitutional safeguards. 58 However, the Court's use
of the quasi-criminal label to describe civil forfeiture proceedings has led

constitutional guaranties governing criminal prosecution because government does not have to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and may appeal, defendant has no right to confront
adverse witnesses or refuse to testify, and double jeopardy does not apply to civil enforcement
of remedial sanction).
52. Id. at 403-04.
53. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
54. The pertinent part of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
"[Nior shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S.
CoNsr. amend. V.
55. See Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 403-04 (holding that procedural protections of Sixth
Amendment and double jeopardy clause and self-incrimination clause of Fifth Amendment do
not apply in civil action).
56. See infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (examining relevant criteria for determining when statute, although labeled civil, is criminal in nature).
57. Id. But see Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 400 n.3 (noting that distinction between remedial
or punitive nature of statute may not be determinative inquiry in evaluating when criminal
guaranties apply to civil action). The Mitchell Court said that in deciding when specific criminal
procedural protections apply to civil actions the Court attempts to distinguish between the
type of procedural rule involved rather than whether the statute is remedial or punitive in
nature. Id. See also Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for
Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. Rv. 379, 392 (1976) (stating that Supreme Court
separated constitutional procedural protections into two groups-one group containing provisions applied to narrowly defined criminal sanctions and other group containing provisions
applied to punitive sanctions, whether or not labeled "criminal").
58. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (examining Supreme Court decisions
that hold some civil forfeitures to be quasi-criminal in nature).
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to inconsistent application of the criminal constitutional protections. 9 In
Boyd v. United States,60 the Supreme Court applied the Fourth Amendment 6
and the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to a civil forfeiture
proceeding. 6 2 In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the main
objective of the civil forfeiture-the penalization of the property owner for
the commission of an underlying criminal offense. 6" The Court characterized
such proceedings as quasi-criminal in nature." Although the Court has
refused to give full scope to the reasoning and dicta of Boyd,65 the
proposition that civil forfeitures are quasi-criminal in nature has remained
intact."

59. See Clark, supra note 57, at 381-97 (noting Supreme Court's inconsistent approach
to determining when constitutional criminal guaranties apply in civil proceedings). One commentator harshly criticized the Court's characterization of civil forfeitures as quasi-criminal,
because no textual support exists in the Constitution for such a hybrid distinction, nor does
the Constitution create a hierarchy of rights afforded the criminal defendant. Note, Fear and
Loathing, supra note 27, at 1159-60. The Court's inability to account for why some constitutional criminal guaranties are applicable to a civil forfeiture proceeding when others are not
may be partly explained by the Court's piecemeal examination of each of the potentially
applicable constitutional provisions. Id. See also Note, ConstitutionalRights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88 CoLtrm. L. R-v. 390, 393 (1988) (authored by Jay A. Rosenberg) (noting
Supreme Court's uneven and uncertain treatment of in rem forfeiture).
60. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
61. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.

62. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621 (1886). In Boyd, the Supreme Court
addressed the applicability of the Fourth Amendment and the self-incrimination clause of the
Fifth Amendment to an in rem forfeiture proceeding. Id. at 618. Boyd involved a merchant's
forfeiture of thirty-five cases of plate glass for violating certain customs laws. Id. The
government demanded that the claimants produce invoices regarding cases of previously
imported glass. Id. The claimants objected to the government's subpoena requiring production
of the invoices on the grounds that the production constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and compelled evidence from the claimants in violation
of the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Court upheld the merchant's claim because the search and
seizure of documents from the claimants was needed to render the government's forfeiture
suit successful. Id. at 633. The Court stated that this search and seizure was therefore
functionally equivalent to compelling a person to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding.
Id. at 638. The Court said that civil forfeitures initiated by the government in order to penalize
a property owner for underlying criminal offenses are quasi-criminal in nature, and therefore
sufficiently criminal for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and the self-incrimination clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 633-34.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 634.
65. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253 (1980) (finding that Court no longer
follows full scope of Boyd).
66. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971)
(holding that Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause permitted claimant to refuse to file
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Even though the Supreme Court uses the quasi-criminal label'to classify
civil forfeiture proceedings for purposes of finding the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments applicable, 67 the Court has not made every constitutional
criminal protection available in civil forfeiture proceedings. If the Court
classifies the forfeiture statute at issue as having a remedial, rather than a
punitive, purpose, then the Court does not require constitutional criminal
guaranties in the proceeding. 69 The relevant inquiry is whether the statute
authorizes a sanction that is so punitive in nature that the sanction constitutes a criminal punishment requiring the proceeding designed to implement
that sanction to include all the corresponding constitutional criminal pro70
tections.
71
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
the Court identified seven factors
useful for determining whether an act of Congress is so punitive in nature
that the Constitution demands the application of the double jeopardy clause
72
and the criminal procedural protections contained in the Sixth Amendment.
The Court identified the factors from previous decisions applying traditional
tests used to determine the nature of an act of Congress, including: (1)
whether the sanction includes an affirmative disability or restraint; (2)

incriminating tax documents that government wanted to use in later civil action to seize money
claimant earned in illegal bookmaking operation); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965) (holding that government cannot use evidence obtained in violation
of Fourth Amendment in later civil forfeiture proceeding to seize vehicle used to illegally
transport intoxicating liquor across state line); Note, Narrowing Civil Drug Forfeiture: Section
881, SubstantialConnection and the Eighth Amendment, 89 MICH. L. REv. 165, 183-84 (1990)
(authored by James B. Speta) [hereinafter Note, Narrowing Civil Drug Forfeiture] (noting
decisions after Boyd that use quasi-criminal label to describe civil forfeiture proceedings).
67. See supra note 66 (noting Supreme Court cases finding civil forfeiture sufficiently
criminal in nature for some constitutional protections to apply).
68. See infra note 69 (examining cases where Court has found civil forfeiture to be civil
in nature because forfeiture statute serves remedial purpose).
69. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-66 (1984)
(holding that double jeopardy clause is inapplicable in later civil forfeiture of firearms due to
remedial purpose of forfeiture statute); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409
U.S. 232, 235-37 (1972) (holding that defendant's acquittal on smuggling charge does not bar
later civil action seeking forfeiture of goods violating tariff law because forfeiture statute is
remedial in nature).
70. See infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text (setting out Court's analysis for
determining when civil statute is so punitive in nature that full range of constitutional criminal
guaranties should apply).
71. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
72. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). The Mendoza-Marlinez
Court faced the question of whether an ex parte civil proceeding sufficiently safeguarded the
rights of individuals who were stripped of their United States citizenship because they fled the
country to avoid military conscription. Id. at 164. Recognizing both the right of citizenship
guaranteed by the Constitution and the necessary power of Congress to require citizens to
serve in the military, the Court held that in such a situation Congress can deprive an individual
of his citizenship. Id. at 159-60. The Court added, however, that if the sanction imposed by
an act of Congress is sufficiently analogous to a criminal punishment, then an ex parte civil
proceeding to impose that sanction lacks the procedural protections required in criminal
prosecutions. Id. at 167.
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whether the sanction historically has been considered a punishment; (3)
whether the sanction involves a finding of scienter; (4) whether the sanction
promotes the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence;

(5) whether the sanction applies to behavior that is already a crime; (6)
whether a rational, alternative purpose may be found for the sanction; and
(7) whether the sanction is excessive in regard to the alternative purpose

73
assigned to it.

In United States v. Ward,7 4 the Court refined the Mendoza-Martinez

test used to determine whether a civil sanction is analogous to a criminal
punishment. 75 The Ward Court addressed the question of whether the

assessment of a civil penalty against an owner of a vessel that negligently
discharged toxic wastes into navigable waters was so penal in nature that

the Constitution demanded application of criminal protections in the civil
proceeding imposing the sanction. 76 The Court adopted a new threshold

inquiry. 77 First, the Court stated, the distinction between criminal and civil
proceedings is a matter of statutory construction.7 s The Court stated that a

court must initially determine whether Congress intended a civil or criminal

penalty.7 9 The Ward Court modified the Mendoza-Martinez test, giving

considerable deference to congressional labeling of statutes as either criminal

73. Id. at 168-69. One commentator suggested that the application of specific MendozaMartinez factors to a particular statute is really a determination of the dominant purpose of
the statute. Clark, supra note 57, at 435-90. Clark argues that statutes which restrict the
application of the double jeopardy clause and the procedural protections of the Sixth Amendment should be subject to the same sort of strict scrutiny analysis that the Supreme Court
uses in the equal protection and First Amendment areas. Id. at 444-89. The basic inquiry,
says Clark, is whether the burden placed on the constitutional rights at issue serves some valid
remedial or regulatory purpose that justifies the burden. Id. at 445. If a less restrictive
alternative exists, then the statute implementing the remedial purpose is overbroad, and the
statute serves no valid purpose by its overbreadth except to burden constitutional rights. Id.
at 448-49. By reassembling the Mendoza-Martinez factors used in determining whether punishment is the dominant purpose of a statute, Clark avoids the inherent problems associated with
the use of legislative history as evidence of congressional intent. Id. at 454-61. See Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. Rnv. 863, 870 (1930) (suggesting that legislative intent
is a fiction). Dominant purpose is discoverable through less ambiguous indicia than legislative
intent, Clark argues, because the question of whether the law serves a valid governmental
purpose may be answered by asking whether the law is narrowly tailored and administered to
serve the legitimate purpose asserted. Clark, supra note 57, at 447. Clark simply reworks the
final two Mendoza-Martinez factors-whether the sanction serves some alternative purpose
and whether the burden imposed serves that purpose or is excessive-into a kind of strict
scrutiny analysis for determining the dominant purpose of a statute. Id.
74. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
75. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 244 (1980).
76. Id. at 244.
77. Id. at 248.
78. Id.
79. Id. The Ward Court stated that the main consideration in determining whether a
statute is civil or criminal is if Congress expressly or implicitly stated a preference by the label
it placed upon the statute. Id.
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or civil. 0 The Ward Court held that if Congress has indicated a preference
for establishing a civil penalty, only clear proof of a statute's actual punitive
nature, through the application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, 81 can
establish that the statute is actually criminal in nature.12 In Ward, the Court
held that Congress explicitly labeled the statute at issue as civil. 83 The Court
then applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors and determined that the statute
was not sufficiently punitive in nature to require a court to apply all the
constitutional criminal safeguards to a civil proceeding imposing the statutory penalty. 4
Although no court has yet applied the Ward test directly to section 881
public housing leasehold forfeitures, several courts-have applied the test to
other property interests subject to forfeiture under section 881 .85 The courts
deciding these cases have focused upon the non-punitive purposes of section
881.86 These courts have held that section 881 serves an important remedial
purpose because it authorizes the forfeiture of property that could be used
to facilitate drug trafficking.Y The remedial purpose alone was significant
enough for the courts to find that the statute was not criminal in nature.88
However, the forfeiture of public housing leasehold interests presents a
more compelling case for the courts to hold that this kind of forfeiture is
punitive in nature and that constitutional criminal safeguards should apply.8 9
Applying the first prong of the Ward analysis9'-whether Congress expressly
evinced a preference for a civil or criminal sanction by examining the label
Congress placed upon the statute-to section 881 forfeitures of public
housing leaseholds reveals that Congress intended a civil sanction when it
passed section 881. 91 Section 881 is found in the part of Title 21 labeled

80. See Darmstadter & Mackoff, Some Constitutional and Practical Considerations of
Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881, 9 WHrMT R L. Rv. 27, 49 (1987) (noting that Ward
decision refines the Mendoza-Martinez test in favor of congressional discretion).
81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (identifying Mendoza-Martinez factors).
82. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49.
83. Id. at 249-51.
84. Id. But see Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra note 80, at 49 (noting that facts of Ward
did not present Court with difficult case for applying full range of constitutional criminal
protections because penalty amounted to only five hundred dollars and had direct correlation
to cost of clean-up imposed upon society).
85. See United States v. Twenty-five Hundred Dollars in United States Currency, 689
F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that § 881 forfeiture of money exchanged for drugs is not
punitive in nature), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984); United States v. 1985 BMW 635 CSI,
677 F. Supp. 1039 (C.D. Calif. 1987) (holding that § 881 forfeiture of automobile used to
transport drugs is not punitive in nature).
86. Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars, 689 F.2d at 12; 1985 BMW, 677 F. Supp. at 1044.
87. Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars, 689 F.2d at 12; 1985 BMW, 677 F. Supp. at 1044.
88. Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars, at 12; 1985 BMW, 677 F. Supp. at 1044.
89. See infra notes 90-120 and accompanying text (applying Ward and Mendoza-Martinez
to § 881 forfeiture of public housing leasehold interest).
90. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text (setting out two-prong Ward test).
91. See Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars, 689 F.2d at 13 (finding that Congress intended
civil label for § 881 forfeiture); Note, Fear and Loathing, supra note 27, at 1155 (same).
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"Administrative and Enforcement Provisions," instead of the part labeled
"Criminal Offenses and Penalties" where Congress placed the criminal
forfeiture statute.9
Finding that Congress intended a civil label for section 881 forfeitures,
the second part of the Ward analysis requires application of the MendozaMartinez factors. 93 A public housing leasehold forfeiture involves an affirmative disability or restraint-the first of the Mendoza-Martinez factorsbecause law enforcement officials physically and indefinitely bar the public
housing tenant from the rental unit.Y The typical factual setting in which
public housing leasehold forfeitures occur involves physically removing the
tenant from the unit by law enforcement officials, ordering the tenant not
to return to the rental unit, and changing the locks on the unit to prevent
reentry. 9s The seizure and forfeiture of public housing involves an affirmative
disability or restraint analogous to the carrying out of a criminal search
warrant, except that under the Forfeiture Project the tenant is indefinitely
barred from returning to the unit.

Application of the second Mendoza-Martinez factor, whether the sanction historically has been considered a punishment, reveals little because the
civil forfeiture of intangible interests, let alone public housing leasehold
interests, was unknown to the common law.Y
Application of the third Mendoza-Martinez factor reveals that section
881 requires a finding of scienter. Knowledge of the illegal drug transactions

92. Id. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988) (placing civil forfeiture statute in part of Title
21 labeled "Administrative and Enforcement Provisions") with 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988) (placing
criminal forfeiture statute in part of Title 21 labeled "Criminal Offenses and Penalties").
93. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text (setting out two-prong Ward test).
94. See United States v. Leasehold Interest in Property Located at 850 S. Maple, 743
F. Supp. 505, 506-07 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (describing seizure of public housing tenant's leasehold
under § 881 forfeiture proceeding). In 850 South Maple, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan faced one of the first instances of HUD's use of § 881 to
evict suspected drug dealers from public housing. Id. at 506. Before reaching its holding that
the public housing leaseholder is entitled to pre-seizure notice and hearing in a § 881 forfeiture
proceeding, the Maple court noted the circumstances under which the government seized the
tenant's leasehold interest. Id. at 506-07, 509-11. United States marshals and a local police
SWAT team descended upon the apartment in which the claimant, Charlotte Juide, and her
two children lived. Id. at 506. Law enforcement officials awakened Juide and her children at
gun point and gave them less than fifteen minutes to gather some personal belongings before
the marshals physically removed them from their apartment. Id. at 507. Law enforcement
officials then changed the locks, boarded up the windows, and ordered the Juides not to
return to the apartment. Oppat, supra note 1; Gearhart, supra note 1. See also ABA
RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at I (describing typical public housing leasehold seizure using
§ 881).
95. See 850 South Maple, 743 F. Supp. at 506-07 (describing government's seizure of
public housing leasehold interest using § 881); ABA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 1
(same).
96. See SMIr, supra note 22, § 11.03 (noting that traditional in rem forfeiture involved
Crown's receipt of valuable tangible property interests that Crown could use for public good);
supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text (examining historical development of in rem forfeiture).
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is an element of the crime of drug trafficking. 97 Even though section 881
does not require the government to prove the mental state of the claimant,
the claimant may assert an innocent owner defense by proving lack of
knowledge or consent. 9

Under the fourth Mendoza-Martinez factor, section 881 promotes traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence. The legislative
history accompanying the 1984 amendments to the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act suggests that Congress intended to
enhance the use of both civil and criminal forfeitures as a means of
combatting the increase in drug trafficking. 9 Congress passed the 1984
amendments to eliminate the procedural provisions and ambiguities of the
1970 criminal and civil forfeiture statutes that had plagued the effective use
of forfeiture by law enforcement officials. 10° Congress stated that the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment were inadequate to
deter or punish the growing drug trade.10 With the passage of the 1984
amendments, Congress believed that the revitalized forfeiture provisions
would prove more effective in combatting drug trafficking by attacking the
economic base of the crimes." °2 When Congress turned its attention specifically to the 1984 amendment providing for the forfeiture of real property,
it noted that the previous failure to provide for such forfeiture eliminated

97. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988). The pertinent part of § 841 reads:
§841. Prohibited Acts A
(a) Unlawful acts
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or
dispense, a counterfeit substance.
Id. (emphasis added).
98. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). See supra note 46 (examining elements and development
of innocent owner defense).
99. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 33, at 3374. Congress alluded to a 1981 report released
by the General Accounting Office to support its contentions that since the enactment in 1970
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute (RICO) and the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, the forfeiture statutes had fallen far below Congress'
expectations that these statutes would take the profit out of crime. Id.
100. Id. at 3375.
101. Id. at 3374.
102. Id. Congress realized the importance of attacking the economic power bases of
criminals through forfeiture, stating that:
More than ten years ago, the Congress recognized in its enactment of statutes
specifically addressing organized crime and illegal drugs that the conviction of
individual racketeers and drug dealers would be of only limited effectiveness if the
economic power bases of criminal organizations or enterprises were left intact, and
so included forfeiture authority designed to strip these offenders and organizations
of their economic power.
Id. (citation omitted).
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a significant deterrent to using real property to facilitate drug transactions.0 3
Furthermore, local Public Housing Agencies (PHAs) already had the power
to evict tenants engaging in drug-related criminal activity in public housing
units,' °4 giving further credence to the view that the main purpose of the
additional civil forfeiture provision in section 881 was to deter and punish.
Finally, Congress did not appear to have adequately contemplated that
public housing leasehold interests were subject to forfeiture, because public
housing leasehold interests are not the kind of economic power bases that
a remedial civil statute would need to address. 10 In fact, the amendments
to the criminal forfeiture statute, which Congress passed concurrently with
the 1988 amendments to the civil forfeiture statute permitting the forfeiture
of leasehold interests, specifically excluded public housing from the list of
federal benefits otherwise forfeitable.' 6
Applying the fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor, the underlying behavior
that section 881 addresses is already punishable as a crime.1 7 For a section
881 forfeiture to take effect, the government must have probable cause to
believe that the tenant's public housing leasehold is connected to some
underlying drug offense'01 included within the drug-related criminal activities
listed in 21 U.S.C. section 841.'09 The same criminal activity can trigger the

103. Id. at 3378. Noting the irony of not having provided a real property forfeiture
provision in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, the legislative
history of the 1984 amendments states that:
The extent of drug-related property subject to civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C.
881 is also too limited in one respect. Under current law, if a person uses a boat
or car to transport narcotics or uses equipment to manufacture dangerous drugs,
his use of the property renders it subject to civil forfeiture. But if he uses a secluded
barn to store tons of marihuana or uses his house as a manufacturing laboratory
for amphetamines, there is no provision to subject his real property to civil forfeiture,
even though its use was indispensable to the commission of a major drug offense
and the prospect of the forfeiture would have been a powerful deterrent.
Id. (emphasis added).
104. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(0(12) (1991); 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(b(S) (1988), as amended by Act
of Nov. 29, 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d()(5) (1991). See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying
text (examining language of statutes, HUD regulations, and Public Housing Agency (PHA)
leases granting local PHAs power to evict tenants engaging in drug-related criminal activity).
105. See S. RP. No. 225, supra note 102, at 3374 (noting Congress' realization that
forfeiture statutes must attack economic power bases of criminals in order to be effective). A
public housing leasehold appears different in nature from the other kinds of property subject
to forfeiture under § 881(a). See supra note 9 (listing property subject to § 881 forfeiture).
Section 881 generally subjects to forfeiture economic power bases used in furtherance of drug
trafficking like controlled substances, drug manufacturing equipment, airplanes, boats, automobiles, money, and guns. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988).
106. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5301, 102 Stat. 4310 (codified
at 21 U.S.C. § 853a (1988), as amended by Act of Nov. 29, 1990, 21 U.S.C.A. § 862 (1991)).
See infra notes 140-57 and accompanying text (providing relevant text of § 853a and constitutional considerations that may have motivated congressional passage of § 853a).
107. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988); see supra note 97 (setting out language of § 841(a)(1)).
108. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988); see supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text (examining
§ 881 civil forfeiture procedure).
109. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988); see supra note 97 (setting out language of § 841).
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criminal forfeiture provisions but only after a conviction for the drug
offense." 0 Additionally, HUD regulations"' and local PHA leases permit
evictions for similar underlying drug activity." 2
Applying the sixth Mendoza-Martinez factor, section 881 serves no
rational alternative purpose. Although the courts have, on occasion, assigned
a remedial purpose to the civil forfeiture statute because it inhibits the drug
trade by taking property used to facilitate drug trafficking,"' this rationale
fails when applied to public housing leasehold forfeitures. Public housing
leasehold interests are not the kind of economic power bases that a remedial
civil statute would need to address." 4 In addition, existing HUD regulations
and PHA leases secure the same result-getting drug dealers out of public
housing."'
Finally, applying the seventh Mendoza-Martinez factor, section 881 is
excessive if its main purpose is remedial. The final factor in the MendozaMartinez test involves an inquiry into whether the punitive nature of the
statute is so overbroad that other, less drastic means can achieve the
alternative purpose of the statute." 6 Section 881 public housing leasehold

110. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988); see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (examining

rationale of criminal forfeiture).
111. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12) (1991). Public Housing Agencies can evict drug dealers for
violation of the tenant obligation to "refrain from illegal or other activity which impairs the
physical or social environment of the project." Id.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d()(5) (1988), as amended by Act of Nov. 29, 1990, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1437d()(5) (1991). Section 1437d(0(5) states that:

Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which(5) provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right
to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal
activity on or near such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member
of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control,
shall be cause for termination of tenancy[.]
Id. "Drug-related criminal activity" is defined as the "illegal manufacture, sale, distribution,
use, or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute, or use, of a controlled substance."
Id. See Note, Drug-RelatedEvictions, supra note 7, at 165-66 (examining congressional response
to drug problem in public housing and changes brought about by Anti-Drug-Abuse Act of
1988).
113. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (examining cases holding that § 881

has non-punitive purposes).
114. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting that Congress probably did not
adequately contemplate that public housing leasehold interest would qualify as economic power
base).
115. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (setting out HUD regulation and
Public Housing Agency lease provision permitting eviction of tenants engaged in drug-related
criminal activity).
116. See Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra note 80, at 49-52 (applying Mendoza-Martinez
factors to § 881 forfeitures generally). Darmstadter & Mackoff applied the Mendoza-Martinez
factors to civil forfeitures in general and concluded that § 881 satisfied more factors than
courts admitted. Id. at 50. First, they found that § 881 involved an affirmative disability or
restraint, because the forfeiture stripped an individual of his property without compensation.
Id. Second, Darmstadter & Mackoff noted that the incidental benefits that society receives
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forfeitures are excessive,' 7 and Congress should achieve the remedial purpose
of the statute by a less punitive means. If the alternative purpose of the
statute is to inhibit drug trafficking through forfeiture of property and
economic power bases used to facilitate the drug trade,"" section 881 is
excessive when applied to public housing leasehold forfeitures. First, a
public housing leasehold is different in nature from other economic power
bases used in furtherance of the drug trade like automobiles, airplanes,
boats, money, guns, or drug manufacturing equipment." 9 Second, the
forfeiture of an individual's housing of last resort founded upon mere
a
suspicion of drug dealing is unduly punitive.2'
The application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors presents clear and
convincing evidence that, although labeled civil, section 881 forfeitures of
public housing leasehold interests are criminal in nature. Consequently, the
procedural protections available in the civil forfeiture context are inadequate
when used to deprive persons of these property interests. Only the full range
of rights guaranteed by the double jeopardy and self-incrimination clauses
of the Fifth Amendment and the criminal trial protections of the Sixth
Amendment sufficiently safeguard the interests at stake in the civil forfeiture
of public housing leaseholds.
III. EiGHTH AmENDMMNT ISSUES
The Eighth Amendment is applicable to public housing leasehold forfeitures regardless of whether section 881 is characterized as civil or criminal
in nature.' 2' If the statute is criminal in nature, courts may scrutinize section
881 under the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment.'2 Conversely, if the statute is civil, courts may scrutinize section 881
under the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.'2

from § 881's impeding drug distribution are forms of general deterrence, another traditional
aim of criminal punishment. Id. Third, Darmstadter & Mackoff stated, behavior which triggers
§ 881 forfeiture is already classified as criminal. Id. See also Note, Civil Forfeiture of Real
Property: The Government's Weapon Against Drug Traffickers Injures Innocent Owners, 10
PACE L. Rnv. 485, 516-17 (1990) (authored by Patricia M. Canavan) (applying MendozaMartinez factors to innocent owners of property seized under § 881).
117. See infra notes 121-67 and accompanying text (arguing that § 881 public housing
leasehold forfeitures violate Eighth Amendment).
118. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting congressional desire to use
forfeiture statutes to attack economic power bases of criminals).
119. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (arguing that public housing leasehold
interest is different from other kinds of property subject to § 881 forfeiture).
120. See infra notes 121-67 and accompanying text (examining Eighth Amendment issues
raised by § 881 forfeiture of public housing leasehold interests).
121. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

122. See infra notes 136-57 and accompanying text (arguing that § 881 forfeiture violates
cruel and unusual punishments clause of Eighth Amendment).
123. See infra notes 158-67 and accompanying text (arguing that § 881 violates excessive
fines clause of Eighth Amendment).
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The Supreme Court attempted to define the scope of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause in Rummel v. Estelle.124 Upon
a third felony conviction for obtaining money by false pretenses, the
defendant Rummel, previously convicted of two prior nonviolent felonies,
was given a mandatory life sentence with the possibility of parole under
Texas' recidivist statute. 12 Rummel claimed that a life sentence was grossly
disproportionate to his three convictions for nonviolent felonies and that
the sentence therefore violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment's
cruel and unusual punishments clause.126 Affirming Rummel's sentence, the
Court emphasized the unique nature of capital punishment, the context in
which the most recent successful proportionality challenges had arisen.1 27
The Court stated that the death penalty is different in kind from all other
forms of criminal punishment, because the death penalty is unique in its
rejection of the rehabilitation of the convict and its absolute renunciation
of all concepts of humanity.128 Secondly, the Court noted the case of Weems
v. United States,129 which constituted one of the rare occasions that proportionality review had succeeded in the non-capital case context., As in
the capital case proportionality challenges, the Court focused on the unique
nature of Weems' punishment. 3 ' Convicted of falsifying a public document,
Weems' punishment was cadena temporal-harsh physical labor while in
chains for a minimum of twelve years and one day.3 2 The Court distinguished between Eighth Amendment challenges based upon the nature of
the punishment and challenges that focused on the duration of the punishment.' The Court found that the length of a sentence is completely within

124. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
125. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 264-66 (1980).
126. Id. at 264-65.
127. Id. at 272.
128. Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
129. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
130. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
131. Id. at 274.
132. Id. at 273. The Weems Court vividly depicts the punishment of cadena temporal.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910). The Court noted that the minimum degree
of the confinement in a penal institution was twelve years and one day, with the offender
chained at the ankle and wrist, subjected to hard and painful labor, without assistance from
family or friends, stripped of all marital authority, parental rights, and rights of property,
and unable to participate in the family council. Id. The Weems Court found that even after
the prison bars and chains were removed, the offender was still subjected to limitations on
his liberty. Id. The offender was forever under the supervision of the criminal magistrateunable to change domicile without giving notice to the magistrate and receiving permission in
writing. Id.
133. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274-75. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 (1982) (per
curiam) (finding that successful Eighth Amendment challenges are based upon mode of
punishment instead of length of sentence). Two years after Rummel, the Hutto Court upheld
a 40-year sentence for the crime of possessing less than nine ounces of marijuana. Id. at 37172. The Court said that in Rummel "we distinguished between punishments-such as the death
penalty-which by their very nature differ from all other forms of conventionally accepted
punishment, and punishments which differ from others only in duration." Id. at 373.
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the legislative realm and that Eighth Amendment decisions should not appear
to rest on the subjective views of the individual Justices. 3 4 However, the
Court stated, more objective decision-making is possible when courts concentrate only on the nature of a punishment which is final and irreversible
35
or unique when compared with traditional forms of imprisonment.
Public housing leasehold forfeitures provide courts with the necessary
bright line objectivity that results when comparing highly unusual punishments different in nature from more traditional penalties.'3 When courts
analyze Eighth Amendment challenges to section 881 public housing leasehold forfeitures, no subjective distinctions among individual decision-makers

134. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274. The Rummel Court said that "for crimes concededly
classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms of imprisonment
in a state penitentiary, the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of
legislative prerogative." Id. The Court did note, however, that a proportionality review would
be appropriate in the extreme case if, for example, the legislature imposed a life sentence for
overtime parking. Id. n.11. But cf. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (holding that
courts can review proportionality of sentence length to severity of crime committed); see infra
note 148 (discussing Solem v. Helm).
135. Rummel, 454 U.S. at 275. After discussing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977),
where the Court struck down the death penalty as a cruel and unusual punishment for the
crime of rape, the Rummel Court said that it was less difficult to distinguish between the
death penalty and various other punishments short of the ultimate sanction; whereas, any
constitutional distinction between lengths of sentences was hopelessly subjective. Id.
136. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, Ill S. Ct. 2680
(1991), does nothing to weaken the principle that the cruel and unusual punishments clause
of the Eighth Amendment prohibits certain methods of punishment. Id. at 2693 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). In Harmelin, the defendant Harmelin appealed his mandatory term of life in
prison without possibility of parole for his conviction of possessing more than 650 grams of
cocaine. Id. at 2684. Harmelin claimed that his sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment because it was significantly disproportionate to the crime he committed and
because it was imposed without taking into account the particularized circumstances of the
crime and the criminal. Id. In the portion of Justice Scalia's opinion joined by a majority,
the Court first held that, although severe, mandatory penalties are not unusual in a constitutional sense because they have been used throughout the Nation's history. Id. at 2701. Secondly,
the Court held that simply because capital sentences require an individualized determination
that the death penalty is an appropriate punishment does not justify extending the individualized
capital-sentencing doctrine to sentences of mandatory life in prison without parole. Id. at 270102. The Court based its decision on earlier cases holding that individualized sentencing
determinations are necessary in capital cases because the penalty of death is qualitatively
different from all other forms of criminal punishment. Id. at 2702.
In the portion of his opinion joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Scalia noted that
the cruel and unusual punishments clause "disables the Legislature from authorizing particular
forms or 'modes' of punishment-specifically, cruel methods of punishment that are not
regularly or customarily employed." Id. at 2691. Scalia stated that a punishment does not
violate the Eighth Amendment unless it is both severe and outside the bounds of AngloAmerican common law tradition. Id. at 2699. Finally, Scalia stated that the Eighth Amendment
contains no proportionality principle and concluded that Solem v. Helm was wrongly decided.
Id. at 2686, 2696-701; see supra note 148 (discussing Solem v. Helm). Although the other
three members of the majority did not join this portion of Scalia's opinion, they disagreed
mainly with his overruling Solem v. Helm and the proportionality principle of the Eighth
Amendment, not with his statement that the Eighth Amendment makes distinctions based
upon the type of punishment imposed. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702, 2704-05.
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are possible, as the Rummel Court feared, because the forfeiture of a public
housing leasehold interest, by its very nature, does not involve any comparison between lengths of terms of imprisonment. Secondly, because the
forfeiture of a person's housing of last resort is, in effect, a sentence of
homelessness, 37 a public housing leasehold forfeiture is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation and its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied
in the concept of humanity."" Finally, the civil forfeiture of intangible
property interests, like public housing leasehold interests, was unknown to
Anglo-American common law tradition. 3 9

These Eighth Amendment constitutional concerns may have influenced
Congress' passage of section 853a, a separate statute contained within the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and applicable only to the sentencing provisions of section 853 criminal forfeitures. 14° Section 853a exempts from
forfeiture federal benefits directly related to the health, survival, and welfare

137. See United States v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015,
1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting strong likelihood that loss of public housing will result in
homelessness); United States v. Robinson, 721 F. Supp. 1541, 1544-45 (D.R.I. 1989) (holding
that mandatory forfeiture of federal housing assistance payments for drug trafficking conviction
violated proportionality principle of Eighth Amendment because it would result in sentence of
homelessness). Testifying before Congress about the harsh consequences of evicting tenants
from public housing, Henderson & Berrien said: "Public housing residents, by definition, are
among the poorest and most vulnerable in our society. The economic characteristics of most
public housing residents suggests [sic] that the next stop after eviction for many of these
persons will be a homeless shelter, if they are lucky." Drugs in Federally Assisted Housing,
supra note 7, at 79 (statement of Wade Henderson & Jacqueline Berrien, American Civil
Liberties Union).
138. See 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. at 1032 (noting important role that decent
housing plays in maintaining human dignity); see also Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using
Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the
Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HAsnsmrs L.J. 1325, 1330 (1991) (noting that legislative
declaration must be exclusive determination of whether proceeding is civil or criminal, except
for shadow proceedings and cases involving inhumane punishments). Cheh stated that the
legislative label is not determinative in shadow proceedings-proceedings that mirror a criminal
prosecution in purpose and effect. Id. at 1386 n.325. Cheh's description of the other type of
case where the legislative label is not dispositive might reasonably include public housing
leasehold forfeitures:
[T]he other category of cases that may transcend the civil label is that in which
the punishment imposed so dramatically expresses societal disapproval that its
imposition only can be legitimated through the ceremony of a criminal conviction.
These punishments are those that actually separate a person from civilized society
and label her as not worthy of being a member of the group. Included in this
category of punishments are execution, incarceration, and loss of citizenship, a kind
of banishment that represents the ultimate separation from society.
Id. at 1363 (emphasis added).
139. See SmIrm, supra note 22, § 11.03 (noting that historically in rem forfeiture involved
Crown's seizure of valuable, tangible property interests capable of use for public good); supra
notes 17-27 (examining historical development of in rem forfeiture).
140. 21 U.S.C. § 853a (1988), as amended by Act of Nov. 29, 1990, 21 U.S.C.A. § 862
(1991)).
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of the recipient. 14 1 Public housing is specifically excluded from forfeiture as

a penalty for a drug offense. 142 United States v. Robinson" supports the

contention that Congress was aware of the potential problems raised by the
Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments.'" In Robinson,
the government petitioned the court for the forfeiture of Robinson's lease,
following her conviction for the knowing and intentional distribution of a
controlled substance. 145 The government brought the forfeiture order under
the criminal forfeiture provisions of 21 U.S.C. section 853.14 Although the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island based its
holding on the restrictive language of section 853a that banned the forfeiture
of essential federal benefits,' 47 the Robinson court also noted that the
mandatory forfeiture of the federal assistance payment because of Robinson's drug felony conviction violated the Eighth Amendment's proportion-

ality principle. 48 First, the district court noted that although the criminal

141. Id. Section 853a states in pertinent part:
(a) Drug traffickers
(1) Any individual who is convicted of any Federal or State offense consisting
of the distribution of controlled substances shall(A) at the discretion of the court, upon the first conviction for such an offense
be ineligible for any or all Federal benefits for up to 5 years after such conviction....
(d) Definitions. As used in this section(1) the term "Federal benefit"(A) means the issuance of any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or
commercial license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated
funds of the United States; and
(B) does not include any retirement, welfare, Social Security, health, disability,
veterans benefit, public housing, or other similar benefit for which payments or
services are required for eligibility[.]
Id. (emphasis added). There are no similar provisions for exempting federal benefits relating
to the health and welfare of the recipient from being subject to § 881 forfeiture.
142. 21 U.S.C. § 853a(d)(1)(B) (1988).
143. 721 F. Supp. 1541 (D.R.I. 1989).
144. United States v. Robinson, 721 F. Supp. 1541, 1543 (D.R.I. 1989).
145. Id. at 1542.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1545-46.
148. Id. at 1543-45. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (providing Court's analysis
for reviewing Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges). In Solem v. Helm, the Court
addressed the question of when the length of a punishment is so disproportionate to the
offense committed that it violates the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 284. In Solem v. Helm, defendant Helm was convicted for writing a noaccount check. Id. at 281. Helm was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of
parole because his six prior nonviolent felonies subjected him to South Dakota's recidivist
statute. Id. at 279-81. The Court, by a five-to-four majority, held that Helm's life sentence
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Id. at 303.
The Court stated that the Eighth Amendment forbids not only barbaric punishments but also
sentences disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Id. at 284. The Court noted that a
proportionality review should be based on objective criteria, including: (1) the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the punishment; (2) the sentences imposed on criminals convicted
of different crimes in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed on criminals
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forfeiture statute made the forfeiture of Robinson's property mandatory,
the court had a constitutional duty to ensure that the statute did not inflict
excessive punishment. 49 The Robinson court then focused on the first of
the objective criteria of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis-the harshness of the penalty in comparison to the gravity
of the offense.1 50 The Robinson court examined the circumstances surrounding Robinson's criminal conduct and found compelling the fact that she
had not stored any drugs in her apartment, solicited the undercover agent
to buy drugs, sold a large quantity of drugs, or sold drugs on any other
occasion.' The district court recognized that the forfeiture of Robinson's
apartment and the federal housing assistance payments which subsidized it
would take from Robinson her only means of obtaining housing for herself
and her family.15 2 The district court stated that such a forfeiture was
fundamentally different in nature from other forfeitures, because an order
of forfeiture in this case would amount to a sentence of homelessness for
Robinson and her three young children.'
The same Eighth Amendment concerns which may have prompted the
passage of section 853a present compelling reasons for finding section 881
public housing leasehold forfeitures inherently unconstitutional. First, the
failure of Congress to provide public housing under section 881 the same
protections it provided public housing under the criminal forfeiture statute
of section 853 leads to incomprehensible results. Under the civil forfeiture
statute, the government may seize the public housing leasehold of a person
merely suspected of drug trafficking' 54 while the government cannot subject
the same property interest to criminal forfeiture after a person is actually
convicted of the same offense in other jurisdictions. Id. at 292. But see Harmelin v. Michigan,
111 S. Ct. 2680, 2686, 2696-701 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality principle and that Solem v. Helm was wrongly
decided); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (holding that courts should rarely review
legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment) ; Sundby, The ReasonableDoubt Rule and the
Meaning of Innocence 40 HAsiNos L.J. 457, 479 n.98 (1989) (comparing Supreme Court's
Rummel and Helm opinions). Sundby noted that:
The courts have been extremely reluctant to reverse sentences as disproportionate
and generally have read Helm as limited to the unique case in which life imprisonment
without parole has been imposed for nonviolent offenses....
The courts' narrow readings are in part a result of the Helm majority's attempt
to reconcile its holding with Rummel on the grounds that Rummel was factually
distinguishable ....
The major factual distinction was that Rummel was eligible for
parole, while Helm's life sentence did not have a possibility of parole.
Id. (citations omitted). See also supra notes 124-35 and accompanying text (discussing Rummel
opinion); supra note 136 (discussing Harmelin opinion).
149. United States v. Robinson, 721 F. Supp. 1541, 1543 (D.R.I. 1989).
150. Id.; see supra note 148 (examining Solem v. Helm opinion and development of
Court's Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis).
151. Robinson, 721 F. Supp. at 1544.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text (setting out procedures by which
government may subject property to forfeiture under § 881).
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convicted of a drug trafficking offense in a prior criminal proceeding. 5
Second, an examination of the harshness of the penalty in light of the
gravity of the offense leads to the comparison of a sentence of homelessness
for the offense of suspected drug trafficking. Third, because the civil

forfeiture statute is arguably criminal in nature as applied to public housing
leasehold interests,5 6 courts can no longer hide behind the legal fiction that
an in rem forfeiture affects the guilty property and not the owner. By
emphasizing the fact that public housing is usually housing of last resort
and fundamentally different from other types of forfeitures, courts should
presume that such forfeitures are constitutionally prohibited under the
15 7
Rummel analysis of the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause can also be used to
challenge forfeitures in the civil context, because a fine can include a
forfeiture." 8 The Supreme Court's reasoning in Browning-FerrisIndustries
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.1S9 suggests that the excessive fines clause of the

Eighth Amendment is applicable in a civil proceeding when the government
initiates the action. 60 After examining the history leading up to the adoption

155. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (setting out limits § 853a places upon
criminal forfeiture).
156. See supra notes 90-120 and accompanying text (arguing that forfeiture of public
housing leasehold interests under § 881 is criminal in nature).
157. For other cases expressing Eighth Amendment concerns in § 881 civil forfeiture
proceedings, see United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas
Avenue, 903 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that forfeiture of apartment building where
high-volume drug trafficking occurs is permissible; however, some situations might raise Eighth
Amendment concerns because of § 881(a)(7)'s expansive language), cert. denied, sub nom.
Born v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1090 (1991); United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987 (4th
Cir. 1990) (permitting forfeiture of dentist's office where several illegal prescriptions were
written); United States v. Premises & Real Property Located at 4492 S. Livonia Road, 889
F.2d 1258, 1270 (2nd Cir. 1989) (holding that government must provide pre-seizure notice and
hearing before forfeiture of real property including defendant's home may take place), reh'g
denied, 897 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1990). See also Note, Narrowing Civil Drug Forfeiture, supra
note 66, at 191-96 (examining Eighth Amendment concerns raised by § 881 civil forfeiture);
Note, Fear and Loathing, supra note 27, at 1175-78 (same); Note, Shouldn't the Punishment
Fit the Crime?, 55 BRoorLYN L. Rav. 417, 446-49 (1989) (authored by James M. Strauss)
(examining Eighth Amendment implications of forfeiture of expensive automobile found to
contain small quantity of marijuana).
158. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 632 (6th ed. 1990). Black's defines the term "fine" as
"[a] pecuniary punishment or penalty imposed by lawful tribunal upon person convicted of
crime or misdemeanor .... It may include a forfeiture or penalty recoverable in a civil action[.]"
Id. (citation omitted, emphasis added).
159. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
160. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263-64 (1989). In
Browning-FerrisIndustries, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the excessive
fines clause of the Eighth Amendment can limit the amount of punitive damages awarded in
cases between private parties. Id. at 259. A jury awarded $6 million in punitive damages to
the plaintiff for the defendant's violations of tort and antitrust laws. Id. Refusing to hold
that the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment applied only to criminal cases, the
Court did hold that the clause does not restrict an award of money damages in a civil iuit
when the government neither prosecutes the action nor possesses any right to receive a share
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of the Eighth Amendment, the Court concluded that the main purpose of
the Eighth Amendment is to place restrictions upon the government's
prosecutorial power, thereby preventing the abuse of that power. 161 No

comparable concerns over governmental abuse of prosecutorial power arise
when two private parties are engaged in a civil suit, the Court said. 162

Although the Court refused to develop any standards to determine if
government-imposed fines are constitutionally excessive, the Court did intimate that its ruling in United States v. Halper'63 addresses analogous
Eighth Amendment concerns,' 64 and therefore may prove helpful in an
excessive fines analysis. The Halper Court held that the double jeopardy
clause prevents the government from criminally prosecuting a person and

then bringing a separate civil action for the same conduct when the fine
imposed bears no rational relationship to the remedial objective of reimbursing the government for its costs in pursuing the action.165 A recent
United States District Court ruling used the Halperstandard of excessiveness,

despite rejecting the claimant's double jeopardy challenge, and held that
when a civil forfeiture is unreasonable and unrelated to the damages suffered
by the government, courts should not enforce the sanction. 166 Public housing

of the damage award. Id. at 263-64. But cf. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive
Damages: Some Lessons From History, 40 VAND. L. R-v. 1233 (1987) (arguing that excessive
fines clause of Eighth Amendment is applicable to suits between private parties); Note, The
Constitutionalityof Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 Mica. L. Rav. 1699 (1987) (authored by Andrew M. Kenefick) (same).
161. Browning-FerrisIndus., 492 U.S. at 266-67.
162. Id. at 272. The Browning-FerrisIndustries Court noted the inconsistency of applying
the Eighth Amendment excessive fines clause to private civil litigation because fear of governmental abuse of power is inappropriate in a case where a private party receives exemplary
damages from another private party, and the government receives no portion of the damage
award. Id. The Court cited United States v. Halper for comparison of another limitation on
the government's prosecutorial power-the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 272, 275 n.21. In Halper, the Court faced the question of whether a civil sanction
imposed by the government may be so oppressive and removed from the remedial purpose of
the sanction that it amounts to punishment under double jeopardy analysis. United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 443 (1989). The defendant in Halper was convicted of 65 violations of
the criminal False Claims Act, sentenced to two years' imprisonment, and fined $5,000. Id.
at 437. The government then instituted a civil action, seeking the statutorily mandated amount
of $2,000 for each violation-totaling $130,000 for Halper's 65 violations of the statute. Id.
at 438. Halper's overcharges on the fraudulent Medicare claims he submitted amounted to
only $585, and the government's investigatory and prosecutory expenses were only $16,000.
Id. at 437-38. The Court held that a civil sanction constitutes a punishment, for purposes of
the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, when it serves the alms of punishmentretribution or deterrence-instead of an acceptable remedial goal of reimbursing the government
for its financial loss. Id. at 448-49.
163. 490 U.S. 435 (1989); see supra note 162 (examining Halper opinion).
164. Browning-FerrisIndus., 492 U.S. at 275 n.21.
165. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989); see supra note 162 (examining
Halper opinion).
166. United States v. Certain Real Property & Premises Known As 38 Whalers Cove Dr.,
747 F. Supp. 173, 178-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). In Whalers Cove, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York considered an Eighth Amendment excessive fines challenge
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leasehold forfeitures present close questions under the excessive fines clause
of the Eighth Amendment. Although the monetary value of a public housing
leasehold may not be exorbitant, the indirect costs are incalculable to the
tenant who is rendered homeless. Conversely, the one-time sale of even a
small amount of drugs exacts a high price from the government and from

society because of the costs of developing and maintaining enforcement

programs to deal with the problems caused by drug abuse.' 67 To avoid

deciding the question of excessiveness on a case-by-case basis and rendering
individuals homeless, courts should hold section 881 forfeitures of public
housing leasehold interests per se unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause.
IV.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Property traditionally subjected to in rem forfeiture had to meet two
conditions: (1) the property had to be a tangible object tainted by its
participation in a wrongful act; and (2) the seizure of the property had to
result in the receipt of something of value by the Crown capable of use for
the public good.' 6 Consequently, the civil forfeiture of intangible property
interests was unknown to the common law because intangible property
interests did not meet either of the necessary conditions. Similarly, a public
housing leasehold interest fails to meet the conditions of property historically
subject to forfeiture because a public housing leasehold interest is an

to the government's seizure of claimant's $70,000 condominium under § 881(a)(7). Id. at 174.
The district court attempted to resolve the question of whether the forfeiture was punitive by
using the Halper standard of excessiveness, despite the fact that the district court had rejected
the claimant's double jeopardy challenge. Id. at 176-81. After noting that the Eighth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment safeguard similar interests-protecting
the individual from arbitrary governmental activity-the Whalers Cove court said that if a
civil forfeiture does not legitimately achieve proper remedial goals of making the government
whole for its costs, the forfeiture is unconstitutional because retribution and deterrence are
permissible aims only in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 179. Forfeitures are inherently suspect,
the district court said, because the value of the forfeited property is not inevitably related to
the harmful use to which it is put. Id. at 181. The district court concluded that although the
claimant used his condominium to sell only a small quantity of drugs, the collateral consequences of his activity were enormous because of the governmental expense of maintaining
federal enforcement programs to deal with the drug problem. Id. at 180.
Similar to the Whalers Cove finding that courts should not limit Halper to its double
jeopardy setting, one commentator suggested extending the excessive fines clause of the Eighth
Amendment to government-imposed civil fines regardless of whether the government seeks the
imposition of the fine in a single proceeding or in multiple proceedings: "Courts would not,
as Halper suggested, be free to impose any civil fines that are punitive simply because the
imposition occurred in a single proceeding. Rather, all civil fines deemed criminal in nature
could be analyzed under the excessive fines clause." Note, United States v. Halper, Punitive
Civil Fines, and the Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 112,
146 (1991) (authored by Elizabeth S. Jahncke).
167. See supra note 166 (discussing Whalers Cove finding that drug abuse imposes
tremendous cost on government and society).
168. See SMrr, supra note 22, § 11.03 (examining historical development of in rem
forfeiture); supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text (same).
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intangible property interest,' 69 having value only for the tenants possessing
the leasehold interest.' 70 The right to continued tenancy in a public housing

unit is a property interest in a benefit created by federal regulations
promulgated by HUD, rules adopted by the local PHA, and state law

governing contracts and landlord-tenant relationships. 7 1 These various sources

169. Continued tenancy in public housing, an abstract and intangible interest, is a property
interest protected by the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See
Thorpe v. Durham Hous. Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969) (holding that defendant housing authority
must, before evicting tenants, give notice of reasons for eviction and opportunity to reply);
Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.) (holding that government
cannot deprive person of continued tenancy in public housing project without providing
procedural safeguards), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth.,
433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970) (setting forth types of procedures necessary before public housing
authority may evict tenant), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971). See also Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (defining scope of property interests protected by procedural due
process); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that welfare benefits are matter of
statutory entitlement and notice and hearing required before government may terminate
benefits).
170. See United States v. Leasehold Interest in Property Known as 900 E. 40th St., 740
F. Supp. 540, 541 n.2 (E.D. Ill. 1990) (questioning rationale behind public housing leasehold
forfeitures because extinction of low-income public housing lease provides no tangible benefit
to government). In 900 East 40th Street, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Illinois, during the course of an ex parte probable cause hearing, addressed the
federal government's motions for the issuance of a warrant of seizure and for leave to file
the case under seal until execution of the warrant. Id. at 541. The district court granted both
motions but not before voicing its concerns over HUD's use of § 881 in the Forfeiture Project.
The district court questioned HUD's bypassing conventional and available remedies for eviction.
Id. The district court also questioned the rationale behind the forfeitures of leasehold interests,
noting that the extinction of a low-income public housing lease provides no tangible benefit
to the United States. Id. n.2. The district court expressed concern about the possible punitive
nature of such forfeitures. Id. Finally, the district court was troubled by its potential lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, because a tenant's typical short-term occupancy right in a public
housing project may not rise to the level of property mentioned within the forfeiture statute.
Id. at 542. See also Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390 (1900) (holding that federal court lacks
jurisdiction when there is no subject matter on which judgment of court can operate); United
States v. All Right, Title & Interest in Real Property & Appurtenances Known as 35 Fulling
Ave., No. 91 Civ. 2569 (CLB), slip op. at 10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file) (noting that forfeiture of non-transferable leasehold interest presents courts
with illusionary lawsuit because government can obtain no effective judicial relief of any
value).
171. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972) (listing criteria courts
can use to determine whether constitutionally-protected property interest exists). In Roth, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the refusal of a state university to rehire Roth,
an untenured assistant professor, violated Roth's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
Id. at 566-68. The Court held that Roth's rights were not violated, because the Fourteenth
Amendment did not protect any property interest Roth may have had in continued employment.
Id. at 578-79. In order to have a property interest in a benefit, the Court stated, an individual
must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to the benefit. Id. at 577. The Court found a
mere unilateral expectation of a benefit insufficient for establishing a property interest in the
benefit. Id. The Court held that a person had to rely upon that property interest as necessary
to daily survival. Id. The Court indicated that the basis for a claim of entitlement to a benefit
is usually found not within the Constitution, but rather from an independent source, such as
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of law create the legitimate claim and expectation to the entitlement by

defining eligibility requirements. 72
The seizure of a public housing leasehold interest by the government is
problematic because a public housing leasehold interest is by definition nontransferable.17 1 Unlike an apartment or house, 174 which has physical substance, a public housing leasehold is an intangible interest that exists only
by virtue of the tenant's written lease agreement. It is unclear exactly what

benefit the government receives when it seizes a public housing leasehold
interest

75

The government could not occupy the unit or renew the lease

state law or the statute that actually defines eligibility for the benefit. Id. See also Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (arguing that courts should protect government-created
interests such as welfare assistance, licenses, and services in same manner as more traditional
forms of property); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965) (arguing that entitlements of poor are not protected as effectively
as other entitlements).
172. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437j (1988) (setting forth statutory requirements
defining eligibility for low-income housing assistance); 24 C.F.R. § 913 (1991) (defining income,
income limits, and reexamination of family income for public housing program).
173. A public housing leasehold interest is non-transferable by definition because it is
subject to various eligibility requirements. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437j (1988) (setting
forth statutory requirements defining eligibility for low-income housing assistance); 24 C.F.R.
§ 913 (1991) (defining income, income limits, and reexamination of family income for public
housing program). A prospective tenant must be indigent in order to be eligible for a public
housing leasehold interest. 24 C.F.R. § 913.103 (1991). Under the terms of the lease, HUD
pays a portion of the fair market value of the rent to the owner, the local Public Housing
Agency (PHA), after the PHA certifies the tenant's income for HUD. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f
(1988); 24 C.F.R. §§ 913.107, 913.109 (1991).
174. If the government elected to seize the actual apartment that comprises a public
housing rental unit, instead of the tenant's leasehold interest, the local Public Housing Agency
(PHA), as owner of the rental unit, would have to file a claim to protect its interest and
prove that it was an innocent owner. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (examining
§ 881(a)(7) innocent owner defense). Some PHAs might arguably have a difficult time proving
their lack of knowledge or consent to alleged drug dealing in their rental units.
175. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (noting that government receives no
tangible benefit when it seizes public housing leasehold interests). For an interesting case which
one can use to see the difficulty of the government's position when it attempts to seize leases,
see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). In Calero-Toledo, the
Supreme Court faced the question of whether the forfeiture of a yacht was unconstitutional
because the lessor was innocent of any wrongdoing that initiated the forfeiture. Id. at 664668. The Pearson Yacht Company leased a yacht to two Puerto Rican residents. Id. at 665.
Government authorities found a single marijuana cigarette aboard the yacht and seized the
vessel in accordance with the applicable forfeiture statute. Id. at 665-67. The Court examined
the history and traditional rationales for civil forfeitures and held that the forfeiture statute
in this instance was not unconstitutional simply because it applied to innocent owners. Id. at
680-90. The Court stated that the lessor voluntarily transferred possession of the yacht to the
lessees and failed to prove that it had taken all reasonable precautions to prevent the yacht
from being used for illegal activities. Id. at 689-90. In addition, the Court said that the
forfeiture statute served legitimate government purposes and was not unduly oppressive. Id.
One can highlight the conceptual problems that the forfeiture of leases raises using the facts
from Calero-Toledo. If the government, in Calero-Toledo, had seized the lessees' leasehold
interest in the yacht instead of the yacht itself, the Pearson Yacht Company would never have
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upon its expiration because the government is not eligible for receipt of
these benefits under the controlling statutes and regulations. 7 6 The government would have to pay rent at the full market rate because it is not
indigent and not qualified for the HUD rent subsidy. 1 77 The government's
leasehold interest would expire when the lease expires, and the PHA cannot
renew the lease because the government is not eligible for the tenancy in
the first place. 78 The government could not transfer its interest to a private
third party, such as an eligible tenant, because section 881 does not permit
such a transfer. 79 Nor does section 881 permit the government to return
brought suit. The government would have taken the same interest the lessees had in the vessel.
The government would have had the use of the yacht for the same number of years as the
lessees with the same option to buy at the end of the lease. In addition, the government would
have been responsible for the lessees' obligations under the agreement. Most likely, this would
have included the payment of rent, purchase of insurance, and use of the vessel in a safe and
lawful manner. However, the Court would have had to order the Pearson Yacht Company to
accept the government as a new, substitute party to the still-existing lease agreement with the
original lessees. The lease agreement may not have permitted the original lessees to sublet;
thus, the Court's task would have been a difficult if not impossible one. Unless the lease ran
to the lessees and their forfeits, the lease should not be assignable through a forfeiture action.
The forfeiture of a driver's license provides another example of similar problems the
government encounters when it attempts to seize public housing leaseholds. A driver's license,
like the public housing lease, is an intangible property interest, unique to the individual. The
holder of the license must satisfy eligibility requirements before the license is granted. If the
government seizes the license under a forfeiture statute, it would gain nothing beneficial for
itself or the public. The government would be unable to use the driver's license or give it to
a deserving individual, because the license, by its very nature unique to the eligible individual,
is non-transferable. Furthermore, the expiration of the license would render moot the government's grounds for bringing the civil forfeiture action.
176. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437j (1988) (setting forth statutory requirements
defining eligibility for low-income housing assistance); 24 C.F.R. § 913 (1991) (defining income,
income limits, and reexamination of family income for public housing program).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1988); 24 C.F.R. §§ 913.103, 913.107, 913.109 (1991).
178. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437j (1988) (setting forth statutory requirements
defining eligibility for low-income housing assistance); 24 C.F.R. § 913 (1991) (defining income,
income limits, and reexamination of family income for public housing program).
179. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1) (1988). Section 881(e)(1) provides for the disposition of forfeited
property, allowing the Attorney General to:
(A) retain the property for official use or ... transfer the property to any
Federal agency or to any State or local law enforcement agency which participated
directly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property;
(B) sell any forfeited property which is not required to be destroyed by law and
which is not harmful to the public;
(C) require that the General Services Administration take custody of the property
and dispose of it in accordance with law;
(D) forward it to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for disposition
...

or

(E) transfer the forfeited personal property or the proceeds of the sale of any
forfeited personal or real property to any foreign country which participated directly
or indirectly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property[.]
Id. Even if section 881(e)(1) did permit the government to transfer the leasehold interest to
an eligible tenant, the Public Housing Agency would not be bound by the transferred lease
because it leased the public housing unit only to the tenant signing the lease, and the terms
of the lease specifically forbid subletting. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(0(1) (1991).
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the property to another government agency, like the local PHA, that is not
engaged in law enforcement and did not participate in the actual seizure of
the property. 80
CONCLUSION

When used reasonably and for the purposes for which it is intended,
section 881 places in the hands of law enforcement officials a powerful
weapon for attacking the economic bases of drug trafficking. When used
for purposes not justified by the history of in rem forfeiture,' 8' intended
by Congress when enacting section 881,182 or compatible with the Constitution, 33 the civil forfeiture provision becomes a mechanism for inflicting
excessively harsh punishment. The forfeiture of public housing leasehold
interests presents courts with the latter characterization of section 881.
Consequently, courts must recognize that no historical or statutory justifications exist for the forfeiture of these interests and that grave constitutional
concerns arise when persons are not afforded the full range of substantive
and procedural criminal protections in acivil proceeding imposing a sanction
that is punitive in nature.
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180. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (1988); see supra note 179 (setting out language of
§ 881(e)(1)).
181. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text (examining historical justification for

in rem forfeiture).
182. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text (examining congressional intent in
passage of § 881).
183. See supra notes 51-167 and accompanying text (noting potential constitutional problems associated with forfeiture of public housing leasehold interests under § 881).
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